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Shepherd: Oil and Gas Leasehold and other Estates

Montana Law Review
VOLUME XIV

SPRING, 1953

Oil and Gas Leasehold and Other Estates
*JAMES L.

SHEPHERD, JR.

In all of the states adopting or following the common law it
has been recognized that ownership of the surface carries with
it everything under it or over it; and from earliest times the
courts have applied this rule to solid minerals beneath the surface
of the land. However, many courts have found difficulty in applying this concept to oil and gas, because of their supposedly
fugacious nature. In Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,' the Supreme
Court of the United States stated the rule in Indiana to be:
"Although by virtue of his proprietorship the owner of
the surface may bore wells for the purpose of extracting natural gas and oil, until these substances are actually reduced by him to possession, he has no title whatever
to them as owner."
The trend, however, has been away from this extreme position; and today the courts of most states have adopted either the
rule of absolute ownership of the minerals in place by the owner
of the land, or a qualified ownership in the oil and gas beneath
the land. Oklahoma and Texas, two of the largest producing
states, may be used in illustrating these separate theories of ownership. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has said that the owner
of land has a qualified ownership in the oil and gas beneath it,
which may be termed an exclusive right, subject to legislative control against waste, etc., to explore therefor by drilling wells and
to reduce to possession and acquire absolute title thereto as personal property. This right, says the Court, is the proper subjects
of sale, it may be granted or reserved, and the grantee in such a
*Member of the Houston, Texas Bar, with Baker, Botts, Andrews & Parish. B.A., LL.B. 1916, University of Texas. President, State Bar of
Texas, 1946. Formerly Chairman, Section of Mineral Law, American
Bar Association, 1938-1939.
1177 U. S. 190 (1900).
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case is an "owner" of an interest in land within the meaning of
the tax redemption statutes.'
Texas, on the other hand, has adopted the theory of absolute
ownership of the oil and gas in place." Oil and gas underneath a
tract of land constitute realty; and such minerals may be severed
from the surface ownership, in legal contemplation, by a conveyance of such minerals. A deed to all "land" owned by the
grantor in a specified county, for instance, would clearly convey
any severed mineral estate owned by the grantor.'
It should be noted however, that a grant of the minerals or
the exclusive right to produce them, is generally regarded in all
states (except Louisiana) as creating some character of fee interest,' but when it comes to applying this theory to leases or conveyances of royalty interests, the courts of a given state are not
always consistent in the theory applied.
Once the courts in Texas found themselves, so to speak, they
have been fairly consistent. I may be pardoned for seeming to
dwell too much upon the Texas decisions; but you will understand my greater familiarity with the cases from that state, and
I think the development of the law in Texas on these matters is
interesting and will be illustrative and helpful in other jurisdictions. In the early case of National Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Teel,'
the Court, dealing with an oil and gas lease which was not materially different from the commercial leases of today, held that
such an instrument did not pass an interest in the land, but was
a mere contract for an option by which the lessee might acquire
such an interest, holding in effect that it was an executory contract, a mere franchise or equitable right; and the Court permitted the lease to be set aside for alleged fraud in its procurement, in a suit aaginst an assiignee who admittedly had no knowledge of such fraud. However, in Texas Co. v. Daugherty,' the
Supreme Court of Texas had before it a lease which purported
to grant, sell and convey to the lessee the minerals in and under
"Rich v. Doneghey, 177 Pac. 86 (1918) ; Wright v. Carter Oil Co., Sup.
Ct. Okla., 223 Pac. 835 (1923) ; Cuff v. Kuslosky, Sup. Ct., Okla., 25
Pac. (2) 290 (1933) ; Martin v. Atkinson, Warren & Henley Co., Sup.
Ct. Okla., 154 Pac. (2) 945 (1945) ; Barker v. Campbell-Radcliff Land
Co., Sup. Ct. Okla., 167 Pac. 468, LRA 1918A 487 (1918).
'Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S. W. 717, 107 Tex. 226, LRA 1917F 989
(1915) ; Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., S. W. (2) 27, Tex. 509
(1929).
'Holloway Heirs v. Whatley, Sup. Ct. Tex., 131 S. W. (2) 89, 133 Tex.
608 (1939) ; Id v. Ellington, 131 S. W. (2) 93, 133 Tex. 615.
'Barker v. Campbell-Radcliff Land Co., supra.
'95 Tex. 586, 68 S. W. 979, Sup. Ct., (1902).
'107 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717, LRA 1917F, 989 (1915).
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the land, with royalties reserved, and a statement that it was not
intended as a mere franchise; and the Court held that this particular lease did amount to a conveyance of the oil and gas in
place, and that this was an interest in land, which was subject
to taxation in Wichita County where the land was situated and
not in the domicile of the owner. In Grubb v. McAfee,8 the Court
had before it a lease which provided that upon the discovery of
oil the lessee would become vested with title for a full term of 20
years. In 1903 a well was drilled and a small amount of oil produced. The lessee thereupon intentionally abandoned the project.
Within the 20 year period oil was discovered in large quantities
in the vicinity and the lessee then asserted title to his leasehold.
The Court held that the character of base or qualified fee created
by an oil lease would not survive intentional abandonment. Again
in Texas Co. v. Davis,' the lease similarly provided that upon discovery of oil or gas the lessee should continue in title for a period
of 25 years and as long thereafter as oil or gas was produced. In
1902 a well was drilled and a small amount of oil produced, probably in the aggregate about 1,000 barrels. Here again within the
25 year period when the property became valuable the lessee
sought to sustain his lease. It was shown that the lessee had not
intentionally abandoned the project, but had been forced to do so
because of lack of funds. The court, while recognizing that a
lease conveyed a fee title, classified this as a base or limited fee,
stating that the primary purpose of such a lease, upon the discovery of oil, was the production of it; and held that if such a
lease was abandoned in fact, even though there was no intention
to abandon it, the fee in the lessee would determine and revert
to the lessor.
At the same time the Supreme Court of Texas was considering the Davis case, it decided a series of other cases which established the law in Texas on the nature of the estate created by an
oil and gas lease. The case of Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil
Co., " probably the one most frequently cited, is illustrative. Here
again the question arose over the right of Stephens County to tax
the leasehold estates held by Mid-Kansas Oil Company on lands
situated in that county. The leases did not as in the Daugherty
case, purport to grant the minerals and did not contain any statement that the lease was not intended as a mere franchise; but the
court abolished the distinction which had been supposed to exist
since the time of the decision of the Daugherty case because of
8109 Tex. 527, 212 SW 464 (1919).
'113 Tex. 321, 254
304 (1923).
10113 Tex. 160; 254 SW
S. W. 290; 29 ALR 566 (1923).
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the wording of the granting clause, and held that it made no difference in effect whether the lease purported (1) to grant the oil,
gas and other minerals with the exclusive right to mine and produce the same, or (2) to grant the exclusive right to mine and
take the minerals, or (3) to lease the land for the sole purpose
and with the exclusive right of taking and producing the minerals
therefrom. The Court quotes with approval from an early
Pennsylvania case, as follows:
"What greater estate in the minerals underlying the
surface of a tract of land can a man have than the right
in himself, his heirs and assigns, to mine and remove the
whole of it ?"
Accordingly, the Court held that any oil and gas lease which
gives the lessee the exclusive right to mine and produce the minerals conveys a fee estate in lands, amounting, while such leases
are in effect, to a severance of the minerals and the creation of
a separate estate in the lessee, which is taxable as land in the
county where the land was situated. The Teel case was squarely
overruled.
This doctrine, that a mineral lease creates a limited or determinable fee, established in 1923, has been consistently followed and applied in Texas since that date.
As might be expected, the Oklahoma courts hold that an oil
and gas lease does not vest in the lessee the title to the oil and
gas in the land and is not a grant of any estate therein, but is
simply a grant of the right to prospect for oil and gas, no title
vesting until such substances are reduced to possession by extracting same from the earth,-an incorporeal hereditament.'
The Supreme Court of Wyoming in Boatman v. Andre,"
speaking of the nature of the interest created by an oil and gas
lease, said:
"While it is settled that the title to the land cannot be
lost by abandonment, * * * it is equally well established
that the interest of a lessee under the ordinary form of
oil and gas lease presents a right of a different character.
The right created by the lease, is merely to search for oil
and gas, and, if either is found to remove it from the
land leased. This would appear to make it a profit a
prendre * * *,and hence an incorporeal hereditament,
which may be lost by abandonment." '
"Kolanchny v. Galbreath, 110 Pac. 902, 38 LRA NS 451 ; Frank Oil Co. v.
Bellview Gas & Oil Co., 119 Pac. 260, 43 LRA NS 487.
1212 Pac. (2) 370 (1932).
"See also Joint Stock Land Bank of Denver v. Dixon, Sup. Ct. Wyo.,
(1942), 122 Pac. (2) 842, 140 ALR 1270, where Boatman v. Andre was
cited with approval.
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The Supreme Court of Colorado in Lanham v. Jones," apparently adopted the option theory of oil leases, citing National
Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Teel' (even though that case had in effect
been overruled by the Supreme Court of Texas prior to the date
of the Colorado decision). The more recent decision by the
Supreme Court of Colorado, Mountain States Oil Corp. v. Sandoval," involving an attempt to cancel an oil lease for breach of
implied covenant of development, sheds little additional light on
the theory of the Colorado courts in regard to the nature of the
estate created by an oil lease.
The one case to which I have been cited in Utah, Meagher v.
Unitah Gas Co.," dealt with a very unusual situation and a special
form of lease agreement. The specific holding of the case was
that there was no abandonment of a lease merely by moving off
the rig, if the specific obligations of drilling had been complied
with and there had been no violation of any express provision on
which a termination of the lease might be founded, particularly
since no notice of termination was given prior to filing suit. The
Court might have used this case as an opportunity for declaring
some general principles for the guidance of oil operators and attorneys in Utah, even though somewhat beyond the scope of what
the Court was actually called on to decide.
In Montana the Court has adopted the theory of complete
ownership of the minerals in place, including oil and gas, Gas
Products Co. v. Rankin,' in which case the Court held unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the use of gas for the making of
carbon black. The Court announced the law in Montana (contrary to that stated by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,' to be the law in Indiana):
"Both petroleum and gas, so long as they remain in the
ground, are part of the realty. They belong to the owner
of the land, and are a part of it so long as they are in
it, or subject to his control."
There, however, the analogy with Texas apparently ceases. In
Rist v. Toole County,' the Court quotes with approval language
used in the opinion of Homestake Exploration Co. v. Schoregge,'
as follows:
1268 Pac. 521 (1928).

'Supra.

'6125 Pac. (2) 964 (1942).
"185 Pac. (2) 747 (1947).
u207 Pac. 993, 24 ALR 204 (1922).
"Supra.
'159 Pac. (2) 340 (1945).
n81 Mont. 604, 264 Pac. 388.
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"The owner of the fee has the same title to the oil and
gas in place which characterizes the ownership of solid
minerals in like circumstances, but by his lease, regardless of the form of the granting clause, he does not intend to convey the oil and gas in place or any interest
therein. * * * By a lease of this description the lessee is
vested with a present property right in the leased
premises, namely, to search for oil and gas under the
conditions of the lease and to appropriate them as personal property if found, yielding the stipulated royalty.
This is a right to take a profit from the lands of another
and within the common law classification may be regarded as a profit a prendre."
Citing Mills-Willingham on Oil and Gas, pp. 20, 21, and Veasey
on Oil and Gas, 18 Mich. Law Review, 773.
In fact, doubt is cast on the ownership theory in Montana
by the holding of the Supreme Court in 1938 in Toomey v. State
Board of Land Commissioners', where the Court speaks of the
"migratory

character of gas,"

and says: "There

is no actual

ownership of gas in situ." (Citing as authority, strange to say,
Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, supra).
Perhaps in view of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
in the so-called Tidelands Cases,' where the Court expressly declined to hold that the United States had title to submerged areas
off the coast of these states, but held that the Federal Government had "paramount rights" therein, with full dominion over
the oil thereunder, the distinctions in the different theories regarding the estate of an oil and gas lessee are not as important
as we had supposed. As to the lease itself, however, the two
theories of ownership and estate created have resulted in different rules. In Texas since the payment of the rental was a
limitation on the grant, it as early held that a court of equity
was powerless to relieve against a failure to pay the rental within
the prescribed time due to mistake or accident." The same policy
prevails in other states which have adopted the Texas theory, and
apparently in Montana.'
'106 Mont. 547, 81 P. 2d 407.
S. v. California, 332 U. S. 19, U. S. v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 699; U. S.
v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707.
"Gillespie v. Bobo, 271 Fed. 641, Fifth Circuit; Texas Co. v. Wimberly,
213 S. W. 286; Appling v. Morrison, 227 S. W. 708; Keeler v. Dunbar,
37 Fed. (2) 868, Fifth Circuit; McLaughlin v. Brock, 225 S. W. 575;
Humble v. Mullican, 144 Tex. 609, 192 S. W. (2) 770, Sup. Ct. Texas,
(1946).
"White v. Hunt, 10 So. (2) 539, Sup. Ct. Miss., (1942) ; Hughes v. Franklin, 29 So. (2) 79, Sup. Ct. Miss., (1947) ; McDaniel v. Hager-Stevensson
Oil Co. (Mont.) 243, P. 582; Griffin v. Cedar Creek Oil & Gas Co.
2U.
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It should be noted, however, that the Texas courts have been
equally careful in protecting the lessee under the protective
clauses contained in most leases in regard to assignments or conveyances carrying an interest in the rentals.
Notwithstanding that the failure to pay rental has been
stated by the Texas courts to be an absolute limitations on the
grant covered by an oil lease, later decisions have shown a tendency to modify this rule to the extent of granting relief in
equitable situations under theories of waiver, revival and estoppel. In Humble v. Clark,' the Court holds that a mineral deed
executed by the landowner in which reference was made to the
lease as a subsisting lease, operated as a revival of such lease
even though it had theretofore expired according to its terms for
failure to pay rental; and the same rule was applied in the Federal Court for the Fifth Circuit where the original lease was void
because of defective description." It has been applied even in
cases where the property was homestead.' Again in Humble v.
Harrison,' where the grantee in a mineral deed which was somewhat ambiguous as to the interest conveyed in the land subject
to an existing lease, waited until after the rental paying date and
then advised the lessee oil company that he refused to accept
rentals which had been deposited with his knowledge in the depository bank, because the amount was insufficient, such assignee
was estopped to claim that the proper amount had not been paid.
The Court relies somewhat on the provision in the lease that "no
change in ownership shall impose any additional burdens on
the lessee." Again in Mitchell v. Simms,' the Supreme Court of
Texas held that where the lessor voluntarily accepted late payment of rentals that amounted to a ratification or revival of the
lease.
The Supreme Court of Texas in Waggoner v. Sigler,' while
fully adopting the rule in regard to implied obligation of reasonable development,' holds that breach of such implied covenants
will not authorize forfeiture of a lease, as for breach of condition
subsequent, since it is a mere covenant. The Court further holds,
(Mont) 8 P. (2) 1071; cf. Consolidated Gas Co. v. Reickhoff (Mont.)
151 P. (2) 588.
"Cassity v; Smith, 193 S. W. (2) 991; Benson v. Lacey, 202 S. W. (2)
689. See also Brandt v. Roxana, 29 Fed. (2) 980.
27126 Tex. 262, 87 S. W. (2)
471.
'TGlasscock v. Farmers Royalty Co., 152 Fed. (2) 537.
2'Greene v. White, 153 S. W. (2) 575, 136 ALR 626; Grissom v. Anderson,
79 S. W. (2) 619; Reserve Petroleum Co. v. Hodge, 213 S. W. (2) 456.
'*Sup. Ct., Tex., 146 Tex. 216, 205 S. W. (2) 355, (1947).
863 S. W. (2) 371.
'118 Tex. 509; 19 S. W. (2) 27 (1929).
'See Merrell, Implied Covenants in Oil Leases in Texas.
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however, that where there is no adequate remedy at law a court
of equity is not powerless to do justice and that it may entertain
an action to cancel the lease in whole or in part. This equitable
action for cancellation of a lease has been recognized where there
are extraordinary circumstances and no other adequate remedy.
The rule was first announced in the case of Kleppner v. Lemon ;"
and later elaborated on in the well known Kansas case, Brewster
v. Lanyon Zinc Co.' It has been applied in a number of cases;"
but in a number of other cases cancellation has been denied.'
In those states which have adopted the qualified theory of
ownership of mineral or which hold that an oil lease passes only
a franchise or privilege, no difficulty whatever should be encountered in securing cancellation in whole or in part of a lease
because of breach of implied covenant of development, under this
type of decree. The courts universally hold that they will not
order the doing of an act which would require supervision on the
part of the Court, such as the drilling of a well; but under the
theory of the cases I have just referred to, a decree of an alternative nature is entered,-the lessee is required to drill certain wells
to specified depths or producing sands within a given time, or
the lease, or that part of the lease in question, will be cancelled.
Actually this seems to have been what was done in the recent
Colorado case of Mountain States Oil Corp. v. Sandoval.' In the
opinion it is stated that the decree of the trial court cancelled all
the leases and appointed a receiver; but that the judgment provided that if the lessee in good faith resumed drilling operations
on the premises within 90 days from the date of judgment, the
same would be vacated, and that the court retained jurisdiction
for that purpose. The higher court, after pointing out that this
permision for further development within 90 days after judgment
was not exercised by the lessee, stated that it was of the opinion
ihat cancellation was warranted by the evidence, as to those portions of the leased premises not related to or affected by four
wells which had been drilled. This holding, the Court said, "is
in harmony with equity and good conscience."
"48 Atl. 483 (Pa.).
"140 Fed. 801.
"Scott v. Jackson, 37 S.W. (2) 1068; Carter Oil Co. v. Mitchell, 100 Fed.
(2) 945; Cosden v. Scarborough, 55 Fed. (2) 634; Sauder v. Mid-Continent, 292 U. S. 272; Amerada v. Doering, 93 Fed. (2) 540; Rendleman

v. Bartlett, 21 S. W. (2) 58; Severson v. Barstow, 63 P. (2)

1022

(Mont.).
Armstrong v. Skelly Oil Co., 55 Fed. (2) 1066; Leonard v. Prather, 36

87

S. W. (2) 216; Cowden v. Texas Development Co., 89 Fed. (2) 947;

Hines v. Hanover, 23 S. W. (2) 289.
"Supra.
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The other important type of mineral interest or estate which
must have consideration is the royalty interest. The process of
judicial determination of the character of this interest in Texas
moved along very similar lines to that followed in determining
the nature of the estate created by an oil lease. The first case of
major importance in Texas was Hager v. Stakes.' There the tax
collector of Orange County assessed for taxation as real property
certain royalty interests owned by Lee Hager, a resident of Houston. He contended that the obligation to pay royalties, particularly those arising under leases, was in the nature of a
covenant, a contract right, which was personalty and could only
be taxed in the county of his residence. The Supreme Court carefully analyzed the granting clause in the lease in each instance
and held that where the lessor had reserved a part of the oil and
gas produced which was to be delivered to him in kind (even
though in one case the lessee reserved the right to buy the royalty
oil as produced), he had in effect retained title to that part and
until it was produced it remained a part of the realty and constituted land situated in Orange County. The Court indicated,
however, that where the lessee obligated himself merely to pay
lessor the value of 1/8 of the oil and gas produced, the lessor's
interest was merely a contractual obligation and therefore personal property. It should be borne in mind that at the time this
case arose the Supreme Court, in Stephens County v. MidKansas,' had held that a lease vested title in the lessee to the
minerals in the land, although the extent of the mineral estate
was not before the Court. So in Haker v. Stakes, the Court made
it clear that except in one type of lease, only 7 Aths of the minerals vested in the lessee under an oil lease, the other 1/8 remaining in the lessor.
This was the situation until the case of Sheffield v. Hogg'
was decided. There the Court wiped out the rather artificial distinction it had made in the case of Hager v. Stakes, dependent
on the wording of the royalty provision in the lease or in the
grant; and held that whether the royalty was deliverable in kind
as produced or the lessee was merely to pay the value of it as
produced or had the option to purchase it and pay the value thereof, the lessor in an oil lease had in effect reserved 1/8 of the oil in
place, which the lessee was obligated to produce, without cost to
the lessor, along with the lessee's / part of the oil. In the course
of its opinion, the Court says:
'116 Tex. 543, 294 S. W. 835 (1927).
'Supra.
"124 Tex. 290, 80 S. W. (2) 741.
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"The oil industry in Texas is largely dependent for development, growth, or prosperity, on the doctrine that the
interests we are considering-such as the lessee's and the
lessor's estates under contracts which are in customary
use in Texas-are interests in land; and hence not subject to parol sale, but have the protection of the statute
of frauds, the statutes regulating conveyances and mortgages of real estate, and the statutes requiring the recording of instruments affecting title to or liens on land, so
that purchasers can rely on deed and lien records and
can execute and receive transfers and conveyances in
reliance on true abstracts of title and lawyers' correct
opinions thereon. Were the stability furnished by these
rules withdrawn and the fundamental contracts, on
which the oil business so largely rests, be adjudged by
the Supreme Court to create mere rights in personalty
at some uncertain date in the future, the structure of the
business would be seriously, if not fatally, jeopardized."
Accordingly, the various royalty interests owned by Hogg Brothers in Brazoria County were held to be taxable there as real property, notwithstanding the residence of the Hoggs was in Houston.
The Supreme Court of the United States has confirmed this ruling as applied to lands in Texas, Waggoner Estate v. Wichita
County."
In Sheffield v. Hogg, the Court did not specifically say that
the lessor in an oil lease actually retained title to Y8 of the oil
and gas in place; but the specific holding was that a royalty interest constituted an "interest in lands" which was taxable in
the county where the land was situated, under the Constitution
of the State of Texas. This same rule has been applied to socalled oil and gas payments. In State v. Quintana Petroleum
Co.," the Court had before it a reservation of 7/32 of the oil and
gas, in an assignment and sale of leases, to be delivered to the assignor free of cost of operations, until the proceeds amounted to
$2,000.00. The Court held that this was an interest in land taxable as such in the county where the land was situated and that
it should be valued at its present worth with a decreasing value
each year as amounts were applied to the oil payment.
In those states which maintain the qualified theory of ownership of minerals by the landowner, it would seem logical that
they would apply to various types of royalty interests much the
same theory that they apply to leases: that it is a right, appurtenant to the land, but not a fee interest, and that conveyances of
U. S. 113.
'134 Tex. 179, 133 S. W. (2) 112.
42273
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royalty interests do not convey any part of the land itself. In
Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Dixon," the Supreme Court of
Wyoming held such-an interest to be an incorporeal hereditament,
a profit a prendre, a right appurtenant to land,-not personalty.
If the landowner has only a qualified ownership of the minerals
in place prior to executing an oil lease, then, of course, he would
have no greater interest in the oil in place by virtue of his retained royalty interest. In Rist v. Toole County," the document
was called "assignment of royalty" and purported to assign an
undivided 51/% royalty of and in all of the oil, gas and other
minerals produced and saved from certain land. It recited "and
I do hereby assign said royalty under the lease now covering said
lands as well as any lease or leases that may be hereafter made
covering said premises." The Court held that this was not a
severed interest in the fee and was therefore not separately taxable. The Court quotes" from Glassmire's Oil and Gas Leases
and Royalties, 2d ed., wherein he says:
"It was recognized that simple assignments of royalty
proper, accruing under a lease, conveyed nothing except
proceeds when and as obtained, or purely personal property interests.
"A conveyance or assignment of royalty for a definite or indefinite term of years does not anywhere constitute a grant of minerals, and no severance from the
land is consummated under them. Even in Texas, an
ownership State, it has been held that an assignment of
rents and royalties accruing under an existing lease
amounts merely to a transfer of personal property and
is not such a conveyance of lands as to bring it within
the statute of frauds."
Mr. Glassmire was referring to the Texas case of Caruthers v.
Leonard." Actually the holding in that case was that a conveyance of minerals subject to an existing lease passed no title to
the rentals under the lease; but in the past it was thought that
some language in the opinion justified the application of the
rule also to royalties. The case was subject to much criticism
and fortunately was squarely overruled by the Supreme Court
of Texas in December of 1943, in the case of Harris v. Currie."
This was well over a year before the Supreme Court of Montana
"122 Pac. (2) 842 (1942).
'Supra.
"159 Pac. (2) 343-4.
7254 S. W. 779.
"176 S. W. (2) 302.
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decided the case of Rist v. Toole County; and in my view, Justice
Angstman's position in his dissenting opinion, that a royalty interest is a separate interest in land (relying in part on the leading Texas cases), is the more logical one. Since Montana has the
theory of absolute ownership, it of course, recognizes the right
of the owner to convey a part of the minerals in place and to
vest fee simple title thereto; but apparently a pure royalty conveyance in Montana is not a severed interest in the fee, but some
kind of lesser interest or estate. It has been suggested by some
Montana lawyers that this case of Rist v. Toole County should
have been disposed of by simply saying that the Montana Constitution does not provide for taxation of interests of this character. In Marias River Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co.," the
Supreme Court of Montana said that the word "royalty" has a
well understood meaning in oil operations; that this right belonging to one distinct from the owner of the land, is an interest
in land, which may be conveyed or excepted. It is, the Court
says, an incorporeal interest, which may be regarded as a profit
a prendre. I cannot pass this case without saying that in my
opinion it has created a rather difficult problem for the lawyers
of Montana in the construction of so-called royalty conveyances.
The language in the deed in that case was:
"Reserving * * 0 a 121/2 per cent interest and royalty in
and to all oil and gas or other minerals of whatsoever
nature found in or located upon or under said land
* * *, or that may be produced therefrom."
The Court held that this amounted to an exception of 121/2% of
the minerals in place, which however, would be subject to its pro
rata share of the cost of extraction and marketing. The Court
laid great stress on the fact that the reservation was of minerals
in and under the land. It is submitted, however, that in view
of the fact that it was called a "royalty" and that the interest
was in that to be produced from the land, the Court should have
held that it was a royalty interest as that term is commonly understood.
We have had some interesting cases on this point in Texas.
In Schlittler v. Smith," the grantor in a deed reserved "one-half
interest in and to the royalty rights on all of the oil, gas and
other minerals in, on or under, or that may be produced from the
land herein conveyed." The trial court held that this reserved
one-half of the usual 1/8 royalty; the intermediate appellate court
held that it was a reservation of a full
interest in the minerals
"38 Pac. (2) 599 (1934).
'0101 S. W. (2) 543, 128 Tex. 628.
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in place, saying that it was only by such a reservation that the
grantor could realize 1/2 of the "royalty rights"; but the Supreme
Court held that the reservation was only of a royalty, without
any interest in leasing rights or in bonuses and rentals, and that
it necessarily implied that the grantee had full power to execute
oil and gas leases and that what was reserved was simply 1/2 of
whatever royalty the grantee might thereafter retain in leases
which he executed whether 1/8 or more or less. Another interesting case is Tipps v. Bodine,' where one of the Texas courts did
a masterful job of reconciling apparently conflicting portions of
a mineral and royalty deed and arriving at what was, I think,
the real intention of the parties. In Watkins v. Slaughter,' a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Texas, the land was conveyed by deed, together with a 15/16 interest in the minerals,
the grantor retaining title to 1/16 of the minerals. It was
specified that the grantee was to have all bonuses, rentals and
leasing rights, the "grantor to receive the royalty herein retained
only from actual production." The Court held that this reservation was a 1/16 royalty interest. The Court based its decision
on the grounds that since the grantee was to receive all bonuses
and rentals and had exclusive leasing rights, he had all of the
incidents of ownership of the minerals in fee; and that since the
grantor was to receive his 1/16 share "only from actual production" and since it was called "a royalty," it as evidently intended by the parties that his interest should be a royalty interest, a term which had a well defined legal meaning. I submit
that where an interest is called a royalty interest, this in itself
should be sufficient for the courts of all states to construe the
document as passing title to or reserving exactly that. Any rule
of construction which disregards the well established legal meaning of the term royalty and the common acceptance of that term
by every oil man, is not arriving at the true intent of the parties
and is bringing on untold trouble for lawyers and royalty buyers.
The greatest difficulty in this respect arises in connection
with the so-called "mineral and royalty conveyances," where a
fixed interest in the minerals is conveyed, but, the property being
under an existing lease, the instrument also purports to cover
a stated share of the royalties under such lease, and perhaps to
specify the relative interests of the parties in the future. These
5'101 S. W. (2) 1076.
189 S. W. (2) 699.
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forms have caused infinite confusion which, of course, would be
entirely avoided if the same fraction was used throughout.'
One of the cases which has plagued the Texas lawyers over
the years is Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. " An oil and
gas lease in usual form had been executed covering 320 acres out
of a section of land in Comanche County. Thereafter the lessors
executed to the plaintiff a conveyance of 12 of the oil, gas and
other minerals in and under a specific 90 acres of land out of the
320 acres covered by the lease. The instrument then continued
with the usual "subject to" clause, referring to the lease outstanding, and went on:
"It is understood and agreed that this sale is made subject to said lease but covers and includes Y2 of all of the
oil royalty and gas rental or royalty due to be paid
under the terms of said lease. It is agreed and understood that * * * * in the event that the above described
lease for any reason becomes cancelled or forfeited, then
and in that event the lease interest and all future rentals
on said land for gas and mineral privilege shall be owned
jointly by James N. Duke and wife and * * * Hoffman, each owning /2 interest in all oil, gas and other
minerals in and upon said land, together with 1/2 interest
in all future rents."
The court, applying the rule that ambiguous deeds should be
construed most strongly against the grantor held that the deed
actually conveyed two separate interests in land: (1) an undivided 1/2 interest in the possibility of reverter of the oil and
gas in place under the 90 acres, and (2) an undivided 1 interest
in the royalties under the existing lease on the entire 320 acre
tract. The court defends this construction by saying that it was
undoubtedly arriving at the intention of the parties; but here
again I submit that no lawyer or oil man in Texas, familiar with
practices in the oil business, would ever have given the instrument that construction. The grant of the royalties was not a
separate grant. It was probably unnecessary in the first place;
but it was thrown in purely in explanation of the intention and
effect of the conveyance of the 1/2 of the minerals in the 90 acres;
and the Court should have held the instrument in its entirety
applicable only to the specific 90 acres described. In a conveyance of an undivided part of the minerals in place, it is, of course,
essential that some reference be made to outstanding leases,
"See again in this connection Tipps v. Bodine, supra, and also Evans v.
Mills, 67 Fed. (2) 840, Cates v. Green, 114 S. W. (2) 592.
"273 S. W. 828 (Tex. Comm. App., 1925) ; see also Grelling v. Allen, 218

SW (2) 896.
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otherwise the general warranty contained in such instruments
would be breached immediately; but as a result of the Hoffman
case, it is now customary to add language which would read, as
applied to that case, in connection with the royalty paragraph,
"as to, but only as to the 90 acres hereinabove specifically
described."
Similar questions may arise in conveyances of mineral and
royalty interests in view of the prevalence of pooling provisions
in modern day leases, particularly as applied to gas wells where
under modern conservation statutes large acreage production
units are required. '
Mr. Summers states the rule in Oklahoma as to royalty interests to be that a grant or reservation of a royalty interest,
whether before or after lease, includes a proportionate interest in
the right to produce the minerals, and a grant or reservation of
the minerals, subject to an existing lease, grants or reserves a
proportionate share of the royalties under existing or future
leases.'
In this connection, I would like to quote from the excellent
article by Mr. Masterson, in a recent issue of the Southwestern
Law Journal," where he is speaking of the interest created by a
typical oil and gas lease:
"Under the qualified ownership theory, it is impossible
to vest a fee title by execution of an oil and gas lease.
This immediately poses the problem whether in such
states the interest should be treated as realty or as per"See Parver v. Parker, 144 S. W. (2) 303, French v. George, 159 S.W.
(2) 566; Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 159 S. W. (2) 472; Brown v.
Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 174 S. W. (2) 43; Tanton v. State National Bank,
125 Tex. 16, 79 S. W. (2) 833; Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Tipken, 190
Okla. 396, 124 Pac. (2) 418; and also Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., Sup. Ot. Tex., (May 14, 1952), 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. Rep. 324
(not yet officially reported.)
It is interesting to note the part that ad valorem taxation has played
in bringing up cases which require the courts to pass on the nature of
mineral, leasehold and royalty interests. My attention has been called
to the recent case of Mitchell v. Espinoaa, 243 Pac. (2) 412, by the
Supreme Court of Colorado. It was there held that a reservation of
"one half of oil rights" in a deed to land accomplished a severance of
one-half of the oil estate-A freehold estate, which would not pass under
tax sale based upon assessment of the land (against the owner of the
surface and the other one-half in the minerals). Likewise, the Montana
case of Riat v. Toole County involved the question of whether a pure
royalty interest was subject to taxation as real property. Both Montana
and Wyoming have statutes for taxing producing leases and royalty interests on net proceeds of production, but apparently In neither state
are non-producing lease and royalty interests subject to taxation.
'"Summers, Oil and Gas, Vol. 3, p. 581.
"WilImer D. Masterson, Jr., Basic Oil and Gas Law, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 1,
SW Law Journal.
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sonalty. This in turn will determine, among other matters, whether the Statute of Frauds is applicable, whether the registration statutes apply, whether the interest
is taxable as realty, and whether the interest can be lost
by abandonment. The cases are in much confusion as to
whether the interest is realty or personalty. It is clear
that because of the large amounts frequently involved in
transactions in this field, justice is best served by treating the interest as realty. This factor, when added to
the consideration that actually an oil and gas lease does
vest a present interest in land (even assuming the premise that there can not be actual title to oil and gas
until discovery), has resulted in a definite trend in favor
of treating the interest as one in realty."
It is submitted that this trend is sound and that it should be
applied to royalty interests of different character as well. Whatever basic theory of ownership is applied, however, I believe the
lawyers should urge upon the courts in the newer oil and gas
producing states, as their jurisprudence is being developed, that
they constantly keep in mind the practical, every day meaning
attributed to such terms as "royalties" in the oil and gas business, and that they seek to construe conveyances of oil and gas
interests and royalties in the light of these meanings. Any other
approach must lead to uncertainty among lawyers when an instrument is submitted for construction and to a body of decisions
by the court of the ad hoc variety which have little value as
precedents and lead to confusion.' Some instruments will undoubtedly come up for construction which are so ambiguous that
their actual meaning cannot be settled except by court decision;
but much litigation will be avoided if the courts do recognize
these well recognized meanings attributed to words in the oil industry and give them practical application in every case except
where other portions of the instrument show beyond question that
some different meaning was intended.
Likewise, until general policies of construction are announced by the courts of any state, the lawyers must go to greater
lengths in identifying the character of interest intended to be
reserved or conveyed by a given instrument. If a mineral fee is
intended, a reference might appropriately be made to corresponding rights of ingress and egress and possession of the surface for
development and producing; whereas if a pure royalty interest is
intended, it would be appropriate not only to call it a "royalty"
6Surrounding Facts and Circumstances in the Construction of Legal Instruments, VIII Tex. Law Rev. 401 (by the author of this article).
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but also to specify that the interest would be delivered free of all
costs of development and operation as produced and saved.
Perhaps I should point out that even in states such as Texas
having the absolute ownership theory, it is now settled that any
statutory or regulatory provision which bears a reasonable relationship either to conservation of these natural resources or to
the adjustment of correlative rights of the owners of property
in a field, or both, is valid. Such orders, of course, must afford
each owner a fair opportunity to produce from the common pool
an amount of oil or gas approximating that which underlay his
land prior to regulation, or alternatively, to receive payment
based upon such amount.'
Perhaps it would also be interesting to note, in conclusion,
that little has been added to the jurisprudence on the subject of
protection of correlative rights of owners in a common pool to
what was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in
1900 in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana.' In the petition in that case,
which was brought in an effort to prevent the waste of gas in connection with producing oil in Indiana, the Attorney General of
Indiana alleged that natural gas was the cheapest and most effective fuel that had yet been found. The vast production of oil
from the East Texas Field compelled a modification of the rule
of capture by a recognition of the necessity of protecting correlative rights of owners in a common pool; and the tremendous increase in the use of gas in the past 50 years, with the consequent
increase in its value, has made it easier for the courts to justify
and sustain regulatory statutes, both for the protection of private
property rights and for the preservation and conservation of
these great natural resources.'
ORepublic Nat. Gas Co. v. Okla., 334 U. S. 62, (1948); Henderson v.
Thompson, 300 U. S. 258 (1937) ; Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55, (1937) ; Marble Head Land Co. v. Los Angeles,
47 Fed. (2) 528, Ninth Circuit, (1931), Cert. denied 284 U. S. 634;
Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210, 86 ALR
403; Marrs v. Railroad Co., 142 Tex. 294, 177 S. W. (2) 941 (1944);
Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U. S. 300, (1920), involving the Wyoming Statute; and MacDougall v. Board of Land Commissioners, 48
Wyo. 493, 49 Pac. (2) 663 (1935).
0177 U. S. 190.
'See Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas, Section of Mineral
Law, America Bar Association (two volumes, one published in 1938 and
the other in 1948).
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DECLAMATORY JUDGMENTS
By: Walter H. Anderson, LL.B. and LL.D.
The First Edition, published eleven years ago, was an authority on
this important subject. The NEW SECOND EDITION deals with
the step by step proceedings necessary to obtain a declaration of
rights. There is presented a comprehensive treatment of how to
file and prosecute an action for declaratory judgment, including
proper manner of defense.
The Declaratory Judgment procedure can often be used at a great
saving of time and expense to the client and trouble to the lawyer.
THREE VOLUMES, bound in Maroon Fabrikoid, $60.00,
delivered. (Pocket Part Supplementation.)
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The important subjects of Block Leasing-Mortgages-ProrationDrilling-Contracts-Gasoline--Conservation-Pipe Lines--Forfeiture-Rents and Royalties-Taxation-Unit Operations-Explosions-Filling Stations-Interstate Compacts-Liens and Legal
Status, are fully and carefully treated in this Permanent Edition.
More than six hundred pages of the work are devoted to the subject
of oil and gas leases; all necessary forms are included in Volume
Six of the work; Thornton is the only work on the subject which
includes all oil and gas Statutes for each of the thirty-three oil
and gas producing states.
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